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WHY ARE THERE RICH AND POOR
COUNTRIES?: SYMMETRY-BREAKING
IN THE WORLD ECONOMY
ABSTRACT
To explain cross-country differences in economic performance, the economics of
coordination failures typically portrays each country in a closed economy model with multiple
equilibria and then argues that the poor countries are in an equilibrium inferior to those achieved by
the rich. This approach cannot tell us anything about the degree of inequality in the world economy.
A more satisfactory approach would be to build a world economy model and show why it has to be
separated into the rich and the poor regions, i.e., to demonstrate the co-existence of the rich and poor
as an inevitable aspect of the world trading system, In the present model, the symmetry-breaking
of the world economy into the rich and the poor occurs because international trade causes
agglomeration of different economic activities in different regions of the world. International trade
thus creates a kind of “pecking order” among nations, and as in a game of “musical chairs,” some








One major challenge for the theory of economic development is to explain
the diversity of economic performances across the countries. In short, “why Are
There Rich and Poor Countries?” The economics of coordination failures attempts
to answer this question by developing a model of multiple equilibria, and arguing
that the Rich countries somehow managed to achieve a Pareto-superior equilibrium,
while the Poor countries fail to achieve a necessary coordination and are trapped
in a Pareto-inferior equilibrium. The most influential work along this line is
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) . In the context of imperfectly competitive
closed economies with aggregate spillovers, they have demonstrated the co-






within their framework why some countries have to be trapped in
while others find themselves in the good state, since the
the good state is no more difficult than in the bad state.
models they developed are static, and taken literally, the
back and forth between the two equilibria. Their paper hence
offers no compelling reason why we have observed and continue to observe the huge
cross-country differences.
in order to eliminate the
imitate the Rich countries,
to be able to do it.”)
(As one commentator said, “according to their theory,
development
and people
One can partially deal with this
problem, all we need to do is simply
in the Poor countries are just too dumb
criticism by making the model dynamic.
For example, in a series of papers, I studied dynamic models of development with
multiple steady states: Matsuyama (1991, 1992) ; see also Ciccone and Matsuyama
(1996) . In these models, the initial condition of the economy plays an important
role in determining the eventual state toward which the economy will gravitate
1(without entirely ruling out the possibility of “economic miracles, ” or “take-
Offsfl, i.e., some comtries may occasionally escape from the poverty trap and
join the club of the Rich countries) . These dynamic models thus help to explain
why the cross-country differences could be self-perpetuating and sometimes tend
to magnify over time, and, at the same time, they are consistent with a few
observations of IIeconomic miracles. “ Nevertheless, these studies do not
explicitly model a mechanism of generating the initial cross-country differences,
and hence come short of offering an answer to the question, “Why Are There Rich
and Poor Countries?”
In all these studies, each country is modelled a closed economy, an
independent, isolated entity. Hence, multiple equilibria suggest merely the




about the degree of inequality in the world economy.
is an attempt to answer this question, “Why Are There Rich and
from a global perspective, although the lessons from the
previous studies are also incorporated here. Instead of portraying each country
in a close economy model with multiple equilibria, and arguing that different
countries are in different equilibria, as the previous studies have done, this
paper offers a model of the world economy, where many (inherently) identical
countries trade with one another. It is shown
the standard of living and in the income
international trade.




According to this model,
the possibility. It is
that cross-country differences in
appear as a stable outcome of
the co-existence of Rich and Poor
an inevitable aspect of the world
developed below adopts many specific assumptions for the sake of
Nevertheless, the logic behind the result is fairly general and
2can be understood intuitively. Imagine that there are a list of goods that need
to be consumed. Furthermore, there are some agglomeration economies in the
production of each of these goods. In the absence of international trade, these
goods must all be produced in each country. Without any imate difference across
countries, each country produces these goods by the same amount, and there is no
cross-country difference. Now introduce the possibility of international trade
in these goods. The equilibrium allocation under autarky remains an equilibrium,
but such a symmetric allocation can no longer be stable in the presence of
agglomeration economies. As different countries start acquiring comparative
advantage in different goods, the production of each good concentrates into some
countries, which leads to an emergence of a system of the international division
of labor. The stable cross-country difference appears as a result of “symmetry-
breaking” in the world economy, caused by international trade. And some
countries become Rich if they are lucky enough to acquire comparative advantage
in goods associated with large agglomeration economies, while other countries,
those which happen to acquire comparative advantage in goods with small
agglomeration economies, become Poor.
From the perspective of an individual country, the problems of Poor
countries may look just like those captured in the previous studies. They fail
to achieve a necessary coordination to reach a Pareto-superior equilibrium and
find themselves in a Pareto-inferior equilibrium. The problems thus seem just
a matter of coordination failures. The global perspective, however, offers a
different view. The international division of labor requires different countries
to take charge of producing different tradeable goods, with differing degrees of
agglomeration economies. International trade thus creates a kind of “pecking
order” among nations. Not all countries can be Rich: some countries must be
3excluded from being Rich, just like in a game of “musical chairs. “ At the same
time, the model does not rule out the possibility that some (but not all)
countries might succeed in overcoming the coordination failures, and becoming
Rich. This feature of the model makes it possible to talk about the effects of
such an “economic miracle” in the world economy.
Although mainly motivated by the development problem, this paper can also
be viewed as a contribution to the literature on North-South trade. The
neoclassical trade theory approaches the North-South problem by first assuming
that there exist some fundamental differences across the two regions of the
world, say in labor productivity or in the factor endowment, and then examining
the consequences of trade between the two regions. This approach cannot
adequately deal with the concerns held by many “structuralist” or “radical”
economists, such as Baran (1957), Myrdal (1957), and most notably Prebisch
(1950) , who believe that international trade is a cause of the huge differences
between the two regions. The approach adopted in this paper explains a
separation of the world economy into the Rich and the Poor through “symmetry-
breaking, ” capturing an element of the radical view of the world economy. The
present framework thus makes it possible to address the validity of policy
recommendations offered by the radical economists in a more formal manner.1
The closest to this paper in spirit is the recent work on economic
geography by Krugman (1991), which shows that a reduction in transport costs
causes a symmetry-breaking to separate the otherwise identical regions into the
manufacturing belt and the agricultural hinterland. In this literature, the
‘Matsuyama (1995) discusses more broadly how the notions of “symmetry-
breaking, ” and “pattern formations, ” borrowed from recent development in
nonlinear sciences, can be useful in thinking about a variety of economic issues,
which camot be addressed appropriately within the neoclassical paradigm.
4factor mobility plays an important role in generating the agglomeration. To the
contrary, the factor mobility plays no role in this paper, which is more relevant
in the context of international trade. A simpler version of the model in this
paper, and a few of its implications, has been sketched in my recent survey
article on complementarities and cumulative processes; Matsuyama (1995, pp.720-
721) . Hence, this paper can be viewed as its elaboration and its extension.
In the next section, I lay out the physical structure of the world economy.
The building blocks of the model are fairly standard, so that I refrain from
discussing specification issues in detail. The purpose of this section is rather
to establish the notations, and highlight the key features of the model. In
section 3, I discuss the equilibrium allocation under autarky. In section 4, I
look at the world economy in equilibrium. In section 5, I discuss some
implications of the model. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Physical Structure of the World Economy.
The world economy consists of a continuum of identical small countries.
Each country is endowed with L units of labor, which is the only primary factor
of production. There are three consumption goods, 1, 2, and 3. Good 1 and Good
2 are tradeable, while Good 3 is nontradeable. (Think of them as Agriculture,
Manufacturing, and Services.) The representative consumer has Cobb-Douglas
preferences over the three goods, which can be represented by an expenditure
function, E = P:’ P:’ P:’ U , where U is utility, Pi the price of good i, and Di
the share of Good i in consumer’s expenditure, satisfying PI + P2 + B3 = 1- BY
denoting the aggregate income by Y, the budget constraint is then written asY = P:’ P:’ P:’ u
The assumption of the Cobb-Douglas preferences
algebra simple, but also implies that both Good I and
(1)
not only helps to keep the
Good 2 (as well as Good 3)
are “essential, “ i.e., there are positive demand for these goods at any finite





world. This feature plays an important role in
consumption goods are produced competitively,
the following
with constant
technologies. All the inputs are nontradeable, and they are
labor and a variety of differentiated intermediate inputs, which are aggregated
by a symmetric CES production function, as in Dixit and Stiglitz. Labor and the
composite of intermediate inputs are combined with a Cobb-Douglas technology with
cri being the share of intermediates. The unit cost
consumption goods sector can thus be expressed as
cl = W1-=J[J 1
‘[p(z) ll-”dz+
o
where W is the wage rate, N the range of differentiated
in the marketplace, p(z) the price of variety z, and u
of production in each
(2)
intermediates available
> 1 the direct partial
elasticity of substitution between every pair of intermediates. It is assumed
that a different sector relies on the intermediate input sector to a different
degree; Sector i spends ai fraction of their revenue on the intermediates.
Without much loss of generality, Sector 2 is assumed to use intermediate inputs
more intensively than Sector 1;
al <a2. (3)
If Goods 1 and 2 are interpreted as Agriculture and Manufacturing, this intensity
6assumption implies that the production cost of the manufacturing sector depends
more heavily upon the local support industries. Needless to say, nothing in the
ensuing analysis depends on such an interpretation. What is critical here is
that the tradeable goods sectors differ in the
local support industries.
The intermediate inputs are supplied by
firms . Each variety is supplied by a single fi.




Km, which uses ax(z) + F units of
labor to produce x(z) units, where F represents the fixed cost. Each firm, aware
of its monopoly power, sets the price optimally, but its market power is
negligible relative to the aggregate economy, so that each firm does not
into account any strategic interaction with other firms. As is well-known,




monopolistically competitive firm, p(z) [1-I/u] = aW. By choice of units, one can
set a = 1 - 1/0, so as to have p(z) . p . W. Hence, the unit cost of production
in each sector, given by (2), is simplified to
(4)
Hence, in all the consumption
but the intensity assumption
than Sector 1.
goods sector, the production cost declines with N,
implies that the cost declines faster in Sector 2
Since all the inputs are priced equally and enter symmetrically in the
production functions, all the input producing firms operate at the same scale,
x(z) = x, and earns the same revenue and the profit, By denoting the revenue of
a firm by S = px = Wx, its wage bill B and its profit 11are expressed as
[1
B = W(ax+F) = l-~ S+WF, (5)and
n=s-B=~-wF. (6)
respectively.
Finally, there is no barrier to entry or to exit in the intermediate inputs
sector, which make all the input producing firms earn zero profit in equilibrium.
3. The Autarkv Equilibrium.
Although the ultimate goal of the analysis is to examine the world economy,
consisting of a continuum of small open economies, let us first look at the
equilibrium allocation of each economy in autarky, which offers a useful
benchmark for the subsequent analysis.
Because of the Cobb-Douglas preferences, all the consumption goods must be
consumed by a positive amount. Hence, in the absence of trade, each economy must
produce all the consumption goods, which means that their prices must be equal
to their costs: that is, from (4),
>
PI = Ci = WN1-” .
(7)
Since the representative consumer spends ~iY on Good i, and Sector i spends




@ = al~l +c2P2 + a3P3 , (9)
represents the share of the intermediates sector in the aggregate income in
8autarky. (Here, superscript A stands for Autarky.) This parameter can also be
interpreted as the degree of the aggregate demand externality, measuring the
extent to which an increase in the aggregate income generates additional revenue
to the monopolistically competitive inputs sector.




] =~[(l-:)s+wF]+[ l-oA]Y. WL = NB+ ~(l-al)~~ Y
1
where use has been made of (5) and (9). Combining (8) and (10) yields
Y=







The downward-sloping curve in Figure 1 depicts eq. (12) , showing how the
revenue of an intermediate input producing firm, S, depends on the number of
firms, N. In the present model, the profit of each firm declines with its
revenue; see eq. (6). This is to say that, given the degree of the aggregate
demand externality, O*,
range of inputs, merely
the presence
reduces the
of more firms, and hence that of a wide
market size per firm, hence, the profit.
Figure 1 thus suggests that a small N implies an excess profit, and a large N
implies a loss, and any plausible entry-exit process would lead to the unique
intersection, where 11 = O, or S/aW =
intermediate inputs (and the nutier of
F. Hence, from (12), the variety of
firms producing them) is
9(13)
in this autarky equilibrium. (Here, superscript A also represents the autarky
equilibrium values of endogenous variables.) Then, from (7) and (11),
YA = W’L , (14
[1
(Pi)’ = wAg+ (15
and, by inserting (14) and (15) into (l), the utility level in autarky can be
derived as
[1
6’L ~ U* = P;p’P;paP;p’ WAL = L —
OF
(16)
4. The World Economy Tradinq Equilibria.
Let us now introduce international trade. In the first subsection, I will
look at the equilibrium allocations of each small open country, taking the terms
of trade exogenously.2 Then, in the second stisection, I will look at the
equilibrium of the world economy, where the terms of trade are determined
endogenously.
4-A. The Small ODen Economy.
For each small open economy the relative price of Good 1 and Good 2, q =
pl/p2, is exogenously given in the world market. Unlike in autarky, whether the
economy produces Good 1 or Good 2 now depends on the ratio of the production cost
in the two sectors, From (4), it can be expressed as
2see Rodrzguez-clare (1993, 1996) and Rodrik (1996) for the analysis of
similar models of a small open economy.
10~2
which increases with N, due to the intensity assumption, (3). This is to say
that an economy with a small N has a comparative advantage in Good 1
(Agriculture), which uses the locally available intermediates less intensively,
and an economy with a large N has a comparative advantage in the intermediate
input intensive Good 2 (Manufacturing) . The threshold level of N, N(q), is
determined by the equality, q = C1/C2:
a-1
N(q) = q“-” .
If N < N(q), then the economy produces only two of the three consumption goods,
Good 1 and Good 3. By denoting the output of sector 1 by Ql, the income identify
takes the form, Y = PIQI + fi3Y , or
PIQI = (1-133)Y.
The total revenue of the inputs sector thus can be written as




el = a1(~1+P2) +a3P3, (19)
represents the degree of the aggregate demand externality when N < N(q) .
(Superscript 1 indicates that, of the two tradeable goods, the economy
specializes in Good 1.) Likewise, the wage income can be written as
WL = NB+ (l-al) PIQ1+ (1-a3)P3Y ‘N[(l-+)s+ wFl+(l-e’)y” ’20)
















(25) ez s az(~l+pz) +a3p3r
(Superscript 2 indicates that, of the two tradeable goods, the economy
specializes in Good 2.)
In Figure 2, the solid curve depicts how the revenue of a firm depends on
the number of firms in the open economy. Equation (22) applies if N c N(q), and
eq. (24) if N > N(q), and there is a jump at N = N(q) .
the autarky case, (12), is
relative locations of the
(3), which implies
defined in (9), (19
that
, and
also depicted in the figure,
two revenue curves reflect
the
(25
The revenue function in
by the dotted curve. The
the intensity assumption
externality parameters, three aggregate demand
# must satisfy the following inequalities:
(26)
Unlike in the autarky case, the revenue of a firm, and hence its profit,
no longer declines monotonically with the number of firms. This is because an
12entry of firms, when it pushes the economy over the threshold level, causes a
shift in comparative advantage, which increases the aggregate demand for the
intermediate inputs.
Figure 2 is also drawn under the additional condition that the terms of






(As will be seen later, this condition must hold in the world economy
equilibrium, once the terms of trade is endogenized.)
As the figure shows, there are three equilibria, in which the profit is
equal to zero; N = Nl, N = N(q), N = N2. Of these equilibria, N = N(q) is a
knife-edge case, where the number of firms is such that the economy’s relative
cost of production in the two tradeable sectors coincides with the terms of
trade. If the economy is slightly below the threshold level, N(q) , the economy
specializes in Good 1, which makes less use of the local intermediate inputs, and
the firms make losses and there is an inducement to exit. If the economy is
slightly above the threshold, the economy specializes in Good 2, which makes
greater use of the intermediate inputs, and the firms make profits, which induce
more firms to enter. Thus , with a slight perturbation and any plausible entry-
exit process, this equilibrium would not be observed. The other two equilibria,
N . N1 and N = N2, are both stable in any plausible entry-exit process in the
sense that, if N is slightly smaller than the equilibrium value, there is an
excess entry and hence an incentive to enter, and if N is slightly larger than
13the equilibrium value, there is a loss and hence an incentive to exit. Under the
condition (27), there are two stable equilibria of this economy.3
The present model thus predicts that the equilibrium allocations of each
country drastically change from the autarky to the open economy case. It is
worth pointing out that this change is not caused by a change in the relative
price of the two tradeable goods. To see this, note that the relative price is
under autarky can be expressed as
(28)
from (7) and (13). Hence, the condition for multiple equilibria in the open






P1/P2 < 02 ~
F < (P1/P2)’ F “
Note that the lower bound is less than one, while the upper bound is
one. Therefore, international trade can cause the drastic change in




In what follows, superscript i = 1, 2, is used to distinguish the
equilibrium values of endogenous variables, depending on whether N . Nl or N .




the economy produces Good i when N = Ni, so that the production cost
must be equal to its price. From (7), this condition pins down the
30ne can also show that, if N(q) s Nl, then N = N2 is the Uniwe stable














(P3)~ = w~N~& = Pi g ‘~:~’ (32)
By inserting these expressions into (1), the utility of the representative
consumer is,
for N = Nl and
(33)
(34)
for N = N2, where use has been made of
terms of change affects the welfare
(16) and (28). Note that a change in the
of the open economy, but its direction
depends on the equilibrium. If N = Nl, the economy exports Good 1, hence an
increase in q . P1/P2 improves the welfare, while it reduces the welfare if N =
N2, that is, when the economy exports Good 2.
4-B. The World Economv.
we are now ready to endogenize the terms of trade, q = P1/P2, and to look
at the world economy as a whole. As shown in the previous section, there are two
possible equilibrium allocations for each country: N = Nl or N = N2. Let f be
15the fraction of the economies, which find themselves
For these countries, the relative cost of producing
in the second equilibrium.





. (~z)~ . EL ~
aF =9’.
For the countries at the first equilibrium, it is equal to
(Recall that q+ and q- have been defined in eq. (27) .) By arranging the
countries along the horizontal axis, first those in the second equilibrium, and
then those in the first, these conditions can be depicted by the step function,
as shown in Figure 3.
From the assumed Cobb-Douglas preferences, the relative demand for Good 1
and Good 2 are D1/D2 = (~1/62)/(P1/p2) . For the economies with N . Ni, the output




(see eq. (17)), while the output of the other tradeable good is zero. Therefore,








respectively. Hence, the terms of trade must satisfy






which is depicted in Figure 3 as an upward-sloping curve.
At the intersection of the two curves, the relative price of Good 1, q*,
is smaller than its relative production cost for the f* fraction of the
economies, hence these economies specialize in
the relative production cost in the rest of the
Good 2, while q* is greater than
world economy, which specializes
in Good 1. The intersection, (f*, q’), thus depicts an equilibrium of the world
economy.4
It is easy to see
tiy point on the upward
that the equilibrium of the world economy is not unique.
sloping curve @(f) between f- c f c f+ is also consistent
with the equilibrium conditions. Hence, this model admits a coritinuum of
equilibria, with the associated range of equilibrium values
> >
[el/e210-l
= f- < f< f+ . 161/e21”-l
~ , >
I. + [ellezlo-1 I + [ellealc-1
and
which is exactly the condition (27), imposed when drawing Figure 2. Hence,
Figure 2 portrays the situation faced by each economy in a world economy
equilibrium.
4A similar geometrical representation of the equilibrium is used in yanagawa
(1996) in his model of a world economy with a continuum of countries.
175. Discussions .
Despite a plethora of equilibrium, indexed by f ~ [f-, f+], the equilibrium
conditions impose such strong restrictions on possible allocations that the model
is rich in its implications, which will be discussed in this section.
5-A. Cross-Country Comparisons.
One major implication of the model, indeed the main purpose of building
this model, is that, without any innate differences across the countries, some
countries (at least 1 - f+ fraction of the world economy) must be in the first
equilibrium and others
The model thus offers a
(at least
theory of
f- fraction) must be in the second equilibrium.
endogenous variations across the countries; two
different types of economies w co-exist in the world economy. Therefore, it
makes sense to talk about cross-country comparisons.
First, let us look at the differences in
(27), (33), and (34), one can easily show that
their standard of living. From
Thus , those economies which end up specializing in Good 2 take the greater
advantage of the aggregate demand externality, and thereby achieve the higher
standard-of-living, than those specializing in Good 1. Hence, the model predicts
an endogenous separation of
This is also true
the world economy into “Rich” and “Poor” countries.
when looking at the factor price and income
18differences .5
incomes across
From (27) and (30), or (31), the range for the relative wages and
the two parts of the world is given by
One of the classical problems
Cheaper in the Poor Countries?”
of development economics is “Why Are Services
Many studies, including Balassa (1964) ,
Samuelson (1964), Kravis and Lipsey (1983), Bhagwati (1984), and Panagariya
(1988) , have addressed this issue, but they all started from some exogenously
postulated differences across the Rich and Poor regions. Although no innate
difference across the countries is assumed, the world economy equilibrium in the
present model can explain the correlation of price levels and the income level
across the countries, by looking at the cross-country difference of the price of
Good 3, interpreted as Services. From (27) and (32),
[1
E2 -m,




F (P3)2 5 F
Thus , if al > a>, i.e., the Service sector is the most labor intensive, then the
Services are cheaper in the Poor countries.
5-B. The Welfare Effects of Trade.
The mere fact that international trade made some countries poorer than
others does not necessarily
answer this, we must compare
imply that trade made them poorer than before. To
the utility levels before and after the trade. From
5Although the factor mobility plays no role in creating the cross-country
differences in this model, introducing a mobile factor might be an interesting
extension of the model. For example, suppose that there are two factors,
immobile labor L, and mobile capital K, which jointly forms a “generalized
factor, ” Z = F(K,L). If the restriction of capital mobility is imposed, then the
present model can be directly applied by reinterpreted by replacing L by Z.
Then, if we allow capital to mover then capital flows from the Poor to the Rich,
which offers an answer to the question posed by Lucas (1990) . And the resulting
capital outflow magnifies the wage difference across the two regions.
19(29), (33), and (34),
and
Thus , the Rich countries unambiguously have benefitted from trade. For the Poor
countries, the lower bound on U1/UA is less than one, hence it is possible that
they may have lost from trade. However, the upper bound may be greater than one,
so that the Poor may have also benefitted from trade.G This is because there
are offsetting gains from specialization, despite the Poor have lost some
benefits of the aggregate demand externality, captured by the change in its
parameter from 6A to .91. One necessary (but not a sufficient) condition for the
Poor to gain from trade is that the terms of trade move in their favor, relative
to the autarky: if the relative price remains at the same level with the autarky,
ul/u* c 1, as should be clear from (33) .
5-c. The Effects of Development Stratecfies: An Individual Country Perspective .
Regardless of whether the Poor countries have gained or lost from
international trade, it is certainly in their interest to switch from the bad
equilibrium to the good one and to become Rich. The natural question to ask is
what
Poor
the government of a
Recall that Figure
countries, trapped
Poor country can do to facilitate such a transition.
2 captures the situation faced by each country. The
in the bad equilibrium, suffer from the coordination
‘For example, if al = 0.2, CYz= 0.8, IY3= 0.1, 61 = 0.6, Dz = 0.2, and p3 =
0.2, then 81 = 0.18, 02 . 0.66, and 6A = 0.3, and the upper bound is
(1.04544)0”06/(0-1) .
20failures. Among a list of prescriptions commonly offered in the economics of the
coordination failure, the least interventionist approach is for the government
to direct a coordinated entry of the intermediate input producing firms, through
some sorts of “indicative plaming. “ The announcement of a government guideline
may help the private sector to coordinate their expectations, thereby succeeding
in reaching a better equilibrium. In Matsuyama (1992), I have argued, in the
context of the Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny model, that the effectiveness of such a
policy announcement depends, among other things, on the gap between the bad
equilibrium and the threshold level. The same argument can be applied here.
(Indeed, Matsui and Matsuyama (1995) discuss the logic in an abstract game of
coordination.) Hence, the government may also want to cotiine such an
announcement with a more interventionist policy to narrow the gap between Nl and
N(q) . For example,
subsidizing Sector 2
it easier to create
imposing the import tariff on Good 2, taxing Sector 1 or
could lower the threshold level in this model, which makes
a coordinated entry of the firms. In the extreme, the
intervention can reduce N(q) to such an extent that N(q) K Nl, which eliminate
the bad equilibrium. The only equilibrium is then N = N2. (Rodrik (1996) argues
that the secret of East Asian miracles can explained along this line.)
As a more direct measure, a temporary autarky may work. If NA > N(q), then
the autarky policy generates a sufficient industrial base, which helps the




The Effects of Development Strategies: A Global Perspective.
In 5-C, I have discussed a few policy options the government might want to
take in order to facilitate successful development, from the perspective of an
21individual country. These policies cannot make all the countries rich, but may
work for some countries. Although the model is silent about which countries can
succeed, it is useful for thinking about the possible spillover effects of such
an “economic miracle. ”
To simplify the argument, I will assume that, once some countries succeeded
in moving from the bad equilibrium to the good equilibrium, they remove all the
interventions that helped them become Rich. As more countries manage to join the
club of the Rich countries, f increases along the upward-sloping curve in Figure
3. As a result, q goes up and the terms of trade move in favor of the countries,
which remain Poor. On the other hand, the terms of trade deteriorates for the
Rich countries. Hence, successful developments of some countries, while a
Pareto-improving move from their viewpoint, are not Pareto-improving from the
viewpoint of the world economy.
Furthermore, the terms of trade effect of such an “economic miracle” on the
countries who remain Poor may be a mixed blessing. As an improvement in their
terms of trade, the Poor countries benefit from an increase in q, provided that
they remain Poor. However, an increase in q, by raising the threshold level of
development, N(q), makes their chance of a successful development smaller. As
discussed above, the effectiveness of the government announcement to direct a
coordination among the private firms harder as the gap between Nl and N(q) grows.
The bigger gap also implies that a bigger intervention is required to eliminate
the bad equilibrium. Furthermore, an increase in q could lead to NA K N(q) , so
that the return to the temporary autarky may no longer generate a sufficient
industry base, when the economy removes the trade barriers. In summary, a
successful industrialization in some countries, and more generally the presence
of early industrializers, may help the Poor agricultural producers by causing a
22favorable terms of trade change, and yet makes it harder for them to follow. In
the extreme case, after f+ fraction of the world economy finished
industrializing, it is no longer possible for the remaining countries to become
Rich (without impoverishing the currently Rich countries.)
Hence, the present model captures the view of the world held by many
radical economists, who believe that the world trading system keeps the South
poor at the expense of the earlier industrializers in the North. Some of them
even argued in the past that the Southern countries could develop only if they
severed the link with the established North, and formed their own economic union
among them. (This was the idea behind some ill-fated common market agreements
in Latin American in the sixties.) The model applies equally to any subgroup of
the countries that choose to trade only among themselves. So, if a group of
e~ally Poor countries forms their own trade union and isolates from the rest of
the world, it would also separate into the Rich and the Poor countries through
a symmetry-breaking. Those unlucky enough to remain Poor may hence be
disappointed and choose to drop out of the union.’
6. Concluding Remarks.
Models with multiple equilibria are the most natural framework for
explaining the diversity. In a model with unique equilibrium, any attempt to
explain the variations of per capita income across regions forces us to introduce
variations in other variables, such as saving rates and education, as is commonly
71n the present model, whether the Poorer countries in the union want to
drop out of the Lion depends solely on the terms of trade prevailing inside and
outside of the union. One can modify the model, such as adding monopolistic
competitive tradeable goods, so that there exist some benefits of trading in a
larger world. Then, when countries became Poorer in the union, they have an
incentive to drop out of the union, because, if they had to be poorer, they would
rather be poorer in a larger trading community.
23done in growth accounting exercises. Yet the variations in these variables
themselves are left unexplained, or need to be explained by introducing
variations in another set of variables. This is not to deny the importance of
growth accounting exercises, as a useful way of summarizing the correlations of
key variables across the regions. But , it tells us little about why poor
countries remain poor, because of the simultaneity of the key variables. On the
other hand, the economics of coordination failures, as a model with multiple
equilibria, can explain the diversity across economies without assuming inherent
differences, and hence they serve as a
One major drawback of models with
argue, is that they often seem to allow
theory of endogenous inequality.
multiple equilibria, as the critic might
so many possibilities on the equilibrium
behaviors, and hence have little predictive content. The previous work on
coordination failures in the area of economic development is subject to such a
criticism. In these studies, each country
isolated entity. Hence, multiple equilibria
the co-existence of Rich and Poor countries;
is modelled independently, as an
merely suggest the possibility of
the models do not tell us anything
about the degree of inequality in the world economy. This
a model of the world economy, explained the inequality as
paper, by developing
an inevitable aspect
of the world trading system, derived some predictions concerning the cross-
country differences, and thereby offered different implications for the way we
think of trade and development and the inequalities among nations.
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